

Message Text

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PAGE 01 NDJAME 00729 211343Z

ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 PM-05

H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 HA-05 /099 W

-----106584 211349Z /46

P R 211205Z FEB 78

FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6373

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 0729

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, CD

SUBJECT: INTERNAL ALIGNMENT IN SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL

SUMMARY: AS THE FIGHTING GOES SOUR FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CHAD IN THE NORTH, THE INTERNAL ALIGNMENT WITHIN THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL IS BEGINNING TO POLARIZE. THIS POLARIZATION IS GENERALLY ALONG THE LINES OF AGE, WITH THE YOUNGER OFFICERS TAKING A MORE FORCEFUL STANCE AND THE OLDER A MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH. THESE LINES OF APPROACH APPLY TO INTERNAL POLITICS, NEGOTIATIONS, AND MILITARY TACTICS.

1. THE FIRST CLEAR SIGN OF THE EMERGING ALIGNMENT WAS THE DECISION NOT TO SEND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMOUGUE TO NIAMEY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE LIBYANS. SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WERE SUPPORTED BY PRESIDENT MALLOUM, VICE PRESIDENT DJIME, AND MINISTER OF HEALTH DJOGO, EVEN THOUGH THEY DOUBTED IF ANYTHING POSITIVE WOULD COME FROM THEM; THEY WERE OPPOSED
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PAGE 02 NDJAME 00729 211343Z

BY FOREIGN MINISTER KAMOUGUE, MINISTER OF EDUCATION GOUARA LASSOU, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE ROASNGAR, AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE MAHMOUD. (THE POSITION OF MINISTER OF WORKS ZAKARIA AND COMMANDER OF THE ARMY ODINGAR, THE OTHER TWO MEMBERS OF THE SMC, ARE UNKNOWN; BUT ONE OBVIOUSLY SIDED WITH THE KAMOUGUE FACTION WHICH CARRIED THE DAY BY A FIVE TO FOUR VOTE.) THE TWO GROUPS ARE BY NO MEANS HOMOGENIOUS; THE

YOUNGER GROUP PARTICULARLY HAS ONLY ONE COMMON GOAL AND THAT IS TO STAY IN POWER FOR THE TIME BEING.

2. THE SPLIT HAD BEEN FORESHADOWED BY A SIMILAR DISAGREEMENT OVER MILITARY TACTICS IN WHICH THE OLDER GROUP WAS IN FAVOR OF EVACUING THE GARRISONS FROM THE NORTH AS SOON AS AIR RE-SUPPLY BECAME IMPOSSIBLE, WHILE THE YOUNGER GROUP WANTED TO STAND AND FIGHT. (IN THIS DECISION, MINISTER ZAKARIA SIDED WITH THE YOUNGER GROUP, WHICH CARRIED THE DAY.)

3. THE GENERAL DIVISION HAD ALSO BEEN CLEAR IN THE STANCE TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS WITH VARIOUS REBEL FACTIONS. IN THIS CASE, THE OLDER GROUP, WHICH WAS MORE READY TO GIVE CONCESSIONS TO THE REBELS, OUTVOTED THE YOUNGER GROUP WHICH TOOK A HARD-LINE STANCE.

4. SCAPEGOATS ARE NOW BEING SOUGHT FOR THE DEFEATS IN THE NORTH. ZAKARIA (THE ONLY PILOT) HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR HIS DIRECTION OF AIR OPERATIONS - ALTHOUGH NO ONE CAN CRITICIZE HIS PERSONAL BRAVERY. COMMANDER OF THE ARMY ODINGAR IS AN OBVIOUS TARGET IN VIEW OF THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF SOME ELEMENTS OF THE CHADIAN ARMY, BUT TO DATE NO ONE ELSE SEEMS TO WANT TO TAKE HIS PLACE.

5. AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE REPUTATION OF SOME MINISTERS
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PAGE 03 NDJAME 00729 211343Z

IS FALLING, OTHERS SEEM TO BE RISING. VICE PRESIDENT DJIME'S HANDLING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS REBEL FACTIONS HAS ADDED TO HIS LUSTER AND MAKES IT CLEAR THAT HE IS THE MOST TRUSTED MEMBER OF THE SMC BY THE VARIOUS DISSIDENT GROUPS. GOUARA LASSOU (THE MOST RADICAL MEMBER OF THE SMC AND THE ONLY ONE WITH AN IDEOLOGICAL BENT), IS BASKING IN HIS QUOTE I TOLD YOU SO UNQUOTE ROLE ABOUT THE NON-APPEARANCE OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. KAMOUGUE TOOK A BRIEF SWING AS COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS APPROACHING FAYA LARGEAU WHEN NEW FRENCH EQUIPMENT WAS ARRIVING, BUT WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT END UP AT THE HERO OF THE NORTH IN VIEW OF THE SLOW PROGRESS OF THE RELIEF COLUMN, HE RETURNED TO HIS DUTIES AS FOREIGN MINISTER. WITH THE FALLING OF ZAKARIA'S REPUTATION, MAHMOUD HAS BEEN EMERGING AS MOST INFLUENTIAL MOSLEM MEMBER OF SMC.

6. MALLOUM IS TIRED AND DISCOURAGED BUT IS STILL ACTING AS THE LINCHPIN OF THE DISPARATE GROUP. AS LONG AS THE KAMOUGUE FACTION CAN WORK ITS WILL THROUGH A CONSENSUS VOTE IN THE SMC, IONWILL PROBABLY NOT ATTEMPT TOPPLING IT. IN FACT, THERE ARE ADVANTAGES FOR THE KAMOUGUE GROUP IN LETTING MALLOUM TAKE THE BLAME OF THE PRESENT MILITARY FAILURES. HOWEVER,

SHOULD NEGOTIATIONS WITH REBELS OR LIBYA CALL FOR TOO MANY
CONCESSIONS, KAMOUGUE AND THE YOUNGER OFFICERS CAN BE EXPECTED
TO MOVE AGAINST MALLOUM AND TAKE OVER CONTROL OF THE SMC.
THE RESULTING GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MORE OVERTLY SOUTHERN
DOMINATED, MORE FORCEFUL AND RADICAL, BUT ALSO MORE UNPRE-
DICTABLE. IT WOULD NOT BE A DISASTER FOR U.S. RELATIONS
WITH CHAD, BUT WOULD IN NO WAY HEAL THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS
WITHIN CHAD.BRADFORD

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COUNTERINSURGENCY, MILITARY GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC ATTITUDES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978NDJAME00729
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780078-0064
Format: TEL
From: NDJAMENA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780233/aaaabble.tel
Line Count: 124
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 87fb60d3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 22 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3536404
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: INTERNAL ALIGNMENT IN SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL SUMMARY: AS THE FIGHTING GOES SOUR FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CHAD IN THE NORTH, THE INTERNAL ALIGNMENT WI THI
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, CD
To: STATE CAIRO
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/87fb60d3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014